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Abstract 
Experiences of developed countries have shown that transparency, accountability, and participation 
significantly reduce corruption, which in turn helps increase access to and improve the quality of public 
services. When it comes to developing countries, the links between governance, corruption, and public 
service quality are under debate. In particular, corruption is widespread in developing countries, and 
combating corruption in these countries are particularly challenging. In Vietnam, despites the government 
effort, corruption remains prevalent in the last decade, as international and national indexes have 
indicated. There is a concern that conventional anti-corruption strategies that focus on promoting 
transparency, accountability, and participation has failed to achieve satisfactory results at the nationally 
aggregated level. The main argument is that such strategies require sufficient resources and capable 
government officials which are lacking in the country. There is also a belief that under complex 
administrative system and ineffective formal institutions, some corruption may help “greasing the 
wheels”, thereby promoting efficiency. This research focused on corruption at the local level and its effect 
on public healthcare and public primary education. 
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Executive Summary and Policy Recommendations 
Experiences of developed countries have 
shown that transparency, accountability, and 
participation significantly reduce corruption, 
which in turn helps increase access to and 
improve the quality of public services. When it 
comes to developing countries, the links 
between governance, corruption, and public 
service quality are under debate.  
In particular, corruption is widespread in 
developing countries, and combating 
corruption in these countries are particularly 
challenging. In Vietnam, despites the 
government effort, corruption remains 
prevalent in the last decade, as international 
and national indexes have indicated. There is 
a concern that conventional anti-corruption 
strategies that focus on promoting 
transparency, accountability, and participation 
has failed to achieve satisfactory results at the 
nationally aggregated level. The main 
argument is that such strategies require 
sufficient resources and capable government 
officials which are lacking in the country. There 
is also a belief that under complex 
administrative system and ineffective formal 
institutions, some corruption may help 
“greasing the wheels”, thereby promoting 
efficiency. 
This research focused on corruption at the 
local level and its effect on public healthcare 
and public primary education. We asked two 
questions in this research: 
1) How do citizen participation, transparency, 
and accountability help reduce corruption? 
2) To what extent does corruption affect 
quality of healthcare and primary 
education? 
Addressing these questions is particularly 
pertinent as in 2016 the Communist Party of 
Viet Nam will hold its national Congress and 
the National Assembly will have elections for a 
new period (2016 – 2020). The results could 
provide evidences for the Party, the National 
Assembly, and the Government to sustain the 
will and revise strategies in combating 
corruptions. We used annual data from the Viet 
Nam Provincial Governance and Public 
Administration Performance Index (PAPI) 
surveys from 2011 to 2014 to answer the 
questions. 
Our results reject the idea that, in the absence 
of efficient institutions and administrative 
systems, corruption can facilitate development. 
We found that corruption reduces quality of 
primary education and healthcare, and that 
effect is consistent over years. This implies that 
Vietnam cannot wait for higher development 
before it can combat corruption effectively. 
Instead, combating corruption is imperative for 
sustainable development. 
Our results also show that transparency, 
accountability, and citizen participation help 
reduce corruption, despite existing complex 
administrative systems. The government 
commitment in fostering good governance 
principles is critical for anti-corruption success. 
Our study offers several recommendations for 
consideration in government policy making to 
enhance local governance and to reduce 
corruption. These suggestions speak to the 
key attributing factors under discussion of this 
research paper: citizen participation, 
transparency and vertical accountability.  
First, active citizen participation in local political 
life through transparent and fair elections of 
village heads is critical. So is it for citizen 
engagement in reporting corruption however 
petty the corruption practices is. Promoting 
citizen activism in the political context of Viet 
Nam requires the openness and pro-
activeness of both sides of the coin: the 
citizenry and the government. With a more 
rights-based constitutional foundation set forth 
in the 2013 Constitution, together with the 
support of new technology and more open 
media, there is light of hopes for greater 
genuine citizen participation for better 
governance in Viet Nam in the years to come.  
Second, genuine participation is hard to obtain 
in anti-corruption agendas when citizens are 
not encouraged to report against any wrong 
doings by public officials and when they feel 
they are not protected when taking anti-
corruption initiatives. As our research has 
shown, citizens’ willingness to report corrupt 
practices decreased in the period from 2011-
2014. Promoting the roles of media and civil 
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society to be the intermediary platforms for 
citizens to report on corruption will help central 
and local governments to prevent corruption. 
Upcoming revisions to anti-corruption 
legislations should spell this out more 
profoundly so as to improve the effectiveness 
of anti-corruption work in Viet Nam.   
Third, citizen participation and the 
accountability mechanism like People’s 
Inspection Boards would be meaningless if 
transparency is not respected. In the last 
decade, the need for more transparency and 
information disclosure has been well 
recognized. However, the relevance (i.e. the 
level of details and disaggregation of data) and 
quality (i.e. the reliability and timeliness) of 
information needs to be improved. In an 
essence, disclosure of budget and expenditure 
information helps reduce corruption at local 
levels while more access to other types of 
government information would be necessary to 
enhance anti-corruption effectiveness. It is 
timely for a Law on Access to Information that 
facilitates rather than policing access to 
information to be promulgated. The law will 
serve as a legal framework to foster 
transparency and engage citizens and 
institutions in calling central and local 
governments into account and keeping public 
service delivery agencies under check to better 
control corruption. In addition, building strong 
databases in important areas, such as a land 
registrar system and an open budget system 
for both central and local governments, would 
be critical in promoting citizen access to 
information.  
Third, accountability to citizens and non-state 
actors need to be fostered among public 
officials and civil servants. As the research and 
UNDP, CECDES and VFF (2014) have pointed 
out, it is important to improve the effectiveness 
of the People’s Inspection Boards, the 
grassroots monitoring mechanisms by citizens 
to keep the performance of public officials and 
civil servants under check. By giving PIBs 
enlarging space, necessary skills and easy-to-
follow toolkits, these boards will exercise their 
mandates and power as promulgated in the 
Ordinance on Grassroots Democracy and the 
Law on Inspection. In order for PIBs to be 
effective, citizen participation in selection of 
their members is a must.   
Last but not the least, fostering good 
governance means that the government needs 
to gain a considerable trust from the public. To 
this end, there should be a fundamental shift in 
the mindset and attitude of public officials. 
Providing good information to the public, 
inviting the public to participate in policy 
agenda, and responding accountably to the 
public concerns are good mechanisms to gain 
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Corruption is widely seen as an obstacle for a country development (Kaufmann, 2005). At the 
national level, corruption deters investment, inhibits innovation, and slows down economic growth 
(Kaufmann, 2005; Lou, 2002). When it comes to developing countries, there still a debate on 
whether corruption has any positive impact on development. A number of studies have found that 
corruption entrenches hunger and poverty, inhibits innovation, and triggers social instability 
(Otusanya, 2011; Nguyen, Ho, Le, & Nguyen, 2016). On the other hand, recent empirical evidence 
supporting the “greasing the wheels” hypothesis does exist (e.g., (Dreher & Gassebner, 2013; 
Meon & Sekkat, 2005; Meon & Weill, 2010; Vial & Hanoteau, 2010). Most of these evidences 
were discovered in economic sectors, such as firm entry, efficiency, or productivity. Whether the 
“greasing the wheels” hypothesis works for socially-intense public services, such as healthcare 
and education, remains unanswered. It is pertinent to collect more empirical evidence to inform 
the debate on this issue. 
Generic anti-corruption strategies often call for transparency, accountability, and participation 
(hereafter, TA&P) (Kaufmann, 2005). The TA&P attributes are believed to reduce officials’ 
discretion, increase community monitoring, and set a solid foundation for a proper punishment of 
corrupted acts (Khan, 2006). The implementation of these strategies, however, requires a strong 
rule compliance behavior and an adequate law enforcement capacity (Hors, 2000; Khan, 2006), 
which often are lacking in developing countries (Garcia-Zamor, 2015; Samaratunge & 
Wijewardena, 2009). In addition, the real driver of corruption in developing countries is not 
necessarily discretion of officials but rather rule-violating behaviour of the related parties (Khan, 
2006). Thus, TA&P strategies may not be effective in reducing at least some types of corruption 
in developing countries (Khan, 2006; Spector, 2005). The debate continues as strong empirical 
evidence, especially at the sectorial level, in developing countries is rare.  
To address these gaps, we asked two questions in this study: i) How do citizen participation, 
transparency, and accountability help reduce corruption? and ii) To what extent does corruption 
affect quality of public healthcare and primary education? We utilized a national citizen survey in 
Vietnam to answer these questions. Vietnam is an ideal setting for studying the relationships 
between TA&P, corruption, and public service quality. The country’s dual ideology (i.e., market 
economy under socialist direction) and ambivalent reform direction offers a unique natural 
laboratory on the dilemma between promoting TA&P and maintaining traditional bureaucratic 
state management (Painter, 2008; Nguyen et al., 2015). The current trend of marketization and 
removal of public welfare has been rooted in the shortage of the state budget, rather than in 
modern public management principles (APIM, 2014). This has created a high potential for 
corruption and quality problems in the delivery of public services (Painter, 2008). Thus, studying 
the links between TA&P, corruption, and public service quality in this country is practically 
pertinent and theoretically meaningful. 
We use the annual Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index 
(PAPI) data from 2011 to 2014 to answer the questions. The data at the individual level allows us 
to reliably demonstrate the relationship between local TA&P and corruption. The panel district-
aggregated data allows us to examine the interplay between corruption and the quality of public 
service delivery, while controlling for the influence of local conditions. As discussed, the links 
between TA&P, corruption and public service quality in developing countries has been under 
debate, and thus, our systematic enquiry of these issues is a contribution to the literature. 
The next section briefly reviews the literature on corruption, its impact on access to quality public 
services, and anti-corruption strategies with special attention to TA&P. Data, empirical strategies 





Effects of corruptions 
General view 
Corruption has been considered to be a major problem in human societies throughout time and 
space. Corruption scandals have been found not only in developing countries (e.g. China, India, 
Nigeria, Vietnam) but also in developed nations (e.g. France, the United Kingdom, the United 
States) (Dong, 2011). While corruption may benefit a smaller number of people holding public 
offices, it hurts the society as a whole because corruption causes harmful effects on economic 
development and social welfare (Kaufmann, 1997). The harmful effects of corruption have been 
documented in a number of studies. Specifically, there exists evidence that corruption reduces 
the incentive of making private investment (Bardhan, 1997), distorts public investment decisions 
(Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Mauro, 1998) and erodes integrity values (Murphy et al, 1991; 1993). 
Wei (2000) and Fredriksson et al. (2003) reveal that corruption lowers foreign direct investment 
(FDI) as it implies a higher expropriation risk.  
In basic areas such as education and health, corruption is found to weaken the provision of these 
public services. According to Giedon et al. (2001) (as cited in Azfar and Gurgur, 2008), corruption 
in the health sector occurs alongside three categories of relationship: between doctors and 
patients; between hospitals and payers; and between hospitals and suppliers. In the doctor-
patient relationship, corruption acts include a doctor’s improper use of public facilities for private 
practice or his/her absence or negligence during duty hours to increase demand for private 
practice. In the hospital-payer relationship, a false bill may be produced. In the latter relationship, 
corruption may take the form of bribery for awarding a contract.  
In any case, corruption leads to higher costs for consumers and, hence, dampens demand for 
health services and may even result in a worse health outcome. It also raises operating costs for 
the government and makes fewer resources available for health services (Azfar and Gurgur, 
2008). In particular, Azfar and Gurgur (2008) find that corruption reduces immunization rates, 
delays vaccination in newborns and lengthens the time of waiting at public hospitals in the 
Philippines. It also enlarges the difference in accessibility to health services between urban and 
rural areas and between the rich and the poor. 
Corruption in education occurs at different scales, ranging from national education ministries to 
universities or schools. Examples include bribes paid to teachers by parents, bribes paid to public 
officials by teachers to get preferred positions or promotion, bribes paid to teachers for lowering 
passing criteria, selling exam information and selling degrees, among others (Khan et al., 2015; 
Nguyen, 2007; Transparency International, 2015; Truex, 2011). 
Corruption in education is often considered to be highly damaging due to its long term effects on 
people’s lives (Khan et al., 2015; Nguyen, 2007; Transparency International, 2015; Truex, 2007). 
Through time, corruption in education erodes all the social, economic and political values of the 
society by destroying personal integrity. Because education often takes up to 20-30 percent of a 
government’s budget, this sector is highly prone to corruption (Khan et al., 2015; Nguyen, 2007; 
Transparency International, 2015). Under the effect of corruption, equal access to quality 
education is no longer guaranteed. The consequence is found to be harsher for the poor as they 
will be more likely to be trapped in poverty if they have low quality education. More severely, 
young generations lose their confidence in the society leading to a serious breakdown of social 




Debate on impacts of corruptions in developing countries 
Generally speaking, corruption is more severe in developing countries than in their developed 
counterparts (Tanzi, 1998). According to Fisman and Gatti (2002a), developing countries are 
often found to have excessive government interventions and discretionary spending and an 
under-performing taxation system which contains high tax rates in concurrent with loopholes and 
nontransparent procedures. The law enforcement in these countries is often found weak. In 
addition, monitoring by non-state actors is usually in a nascent stage. These are the main factors 
that nourish pervasive corruption in the countries. 
Whether corruption has any positive effect in developing countries is still under debate. On the 
one hand, corruption is generally found to harm overall development as it reduces the incentives 
for entrepreneurs to make private investment and distorts public investment. Apart from the stolen 
revenue (e.g., tax evasion and avoidance), corruption erodes integrity and promotes misallocation 
of resources (Hors, 2000; Kaufmann, 1997). Otusanya (2011) conducted a thorough literature 
review and found that most of the studies found harmful effect of corruption. Instead of investing 
in health, education and infrastructure to pave the way for private investment, public investment 
is made in undesirable directions that reduce the quality of that public spending (see Otusanya, 
2011 for a review).  Similarly, Welsch (2004), Pellegrini & Gerlagh (2006) find that corruption 
exacerbates pollution in several developing countries.1 
On the other hand, in the absence of effective administrative system and capable public servants, 
corruption is believed to create some positive impact for a country’s development (Meon and 
Sekkat, 2005; Meon and Weill, 2010). The “greasing the wheels” hypothesis was proposed 
prominently in the 1960s (namely Leff, 1964; Leys, 1965), and remains under debate. Meon and 
Sekkat (2005) summarized the arguments supporting this hypothesis. First, corruption can speed 
up bureaucratic procedures. Bribes are incentives for officials to respond more quickly to citizens’ 
requests. Second, grafts and bribes can serve as supplement income for low wage in government 
jobs. The paper argues that the additional incentive helps attract capable candidates which then 
results in better services. Finally, resources and licenses can be allocated more efficiently as the 
most efficient firms can pay the highest bribes. 
Recent empirical evidence for “greasing the wheels” does exist, albeit less popular than those for 
negative impact of corruption. For example, Meon and Weill (2010) found that corruption reduce 
aggregate efficiency in countries where institutions are effective, yet increases efficiency where 
institutions are ineffective. Dreher and Gassebner (2013) studied whether corruption reduces the 
negative impact of regulation on entrepreneurship in highly regulated economies in 43 countries 
over the 2003 – 2005 period. The authors found that corruption facilitates firm entry in highly 
regulated economies, supporting “greasing the wheels” hypothesis. In a similar vein, Vial and 
Hanoteau (2010) assessed the impact of plant-level corruption on output and productivity growth, 
using panel data from Indonesian manufacturing industry during the Suharto era (1975 – 1995). 
The authors found that corruption, measured as bribes and indirect tax payment, has a positive 
effect on individual plant growth. 
Note that almost all empirical evidences supporting the “greasing the wheels” hypothesis were 
found in the context of underdeveloped institutions, highly regulated and extremely bureaucratic 
                                                
 
1 According to Lui (1985), in an already distorted economy, bribery may increase the overall efficiency of 
that system by greasing the wheel. In a counter-argument, Rose-Ackerman (1999) indicates that the effect 
does not apply to issues such as tax evasion, violation of environmental law or recruitment of disqualified 
people into public offices. Bureaucrats also tend to delay their work in order to increase their chance of 




systems. The positive effects of corruption were found either at micro (firm or even plant) level or in 
purely short-term economic efficiency. The impact of corruption on blocking the reform of such 
inefficient institutions and systems has never been discussed in these studies. In addition, most of 
the evidence supporting the “greasing the wheels” hypothesis was found in the economic sector. 
Whether this hypothesis works in socially-intensive public services, such as healthcare and 
education, remains unknown. Moreover, the impact of “greasing” on equity is largely ignored. Most 
of the positive effect of corruption is for the rich or companies who can afford the bribes. 
We argue that most of corruption positive effect are transaction-specific and short-term. In 
comparison, its overall and long-term impact on blocking institutional reform, eroding innovation 
and integrity is much more damaging to the country (Nguyen et al., 2016). This is especially true 
for public services, such as healthcare and education, where staff morality is an integral part of 
the service quality. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H1: Corruption has a negative relationship with service quality in a) healthcare, and b) education. 
Role of transparency, accountability and citizen participation in anti-corruption 
General view 
In order to enhance the economic efficiency of investment activities and reduce corruption, it is 
required to have transparent mechanisms and procedures of policy making in public offices and 
make government officials accountable for their decisions. As pointed out by Brinkerhoff (2004), 
accountability consists of three key components: measurement of goals and results; justifications 
of those goals and results to monitoring organizations or other factors; and punishments in case 
of non-performance or corrupt acts. Hence, accountability will be greatly improved if things are 
made clear on how inputs are used to produce outputs and there exist monitoring organizations 
and opportunities for other actors to keep close watch on the process. Different incentive and 
punishment schemes should also be in place to reward good performance and penalize poor 
performance (Vian, 2007). Along with accountability is the transparency of information. This 
requires the disclosure of government documents or decisions through public meetings or media 
and information on how performance is measured. Transparency helps strengthen accountability 
and inform citizens of choice (Vian, 2007). 
In combating corruption, citizen participation is as the functioning of formal institutions because it 
reflects citizens’ attitudes towards such acts (Wells-Dang, Le, and Nguyen, 2015). Given that 
citizens play an important role as watchdogs of officials’ behaviors, transparency and 
accountability cannot be efficiently maintained without citizens taking an active stance on rejecting 
and reporting corruption. It is found that people’s propensity to reject or report corruption varies 
across individuals depending on their background of education (Truex, 2011; Lavena, 2013), 
gender (Goetz, 2007), age (Seligson, 2002; Lavena, 2013), and financial well-being (Soares, 
2004; Melgar et al., 2010).2 Having an insight into these issues will help anti-corruption actors 
focus their resources on areas where they work best to encourage citizens to join forces with them 
to address corruption (Walton and Peiffer, 2015).  
  
                                                
 
2 This is cited in Walton and Peiffer (2015). Generally speaking, more educated people tend to deny 
corruption more often and are more willing to reveal about corruption. Corruption is also found less likely to 




Debates on effectiveness of TA&P in developing countries 
Scholars have argued that the problem of corruption in developing countries cannot be solved by 
simply applying anti-corruption structures that work in advanced countries (Hors, 2000; Khan, 
2006). Pure TA&P strategies may not work well at the aggregated level in developing countries 
for several reasons. First, political corruption is quite spread in developing countries (Khan, 2006). 
Many politicians owe their career and status to corruption, and few of them, if any, would stand 
against it (Hors, 2000). For this type of corruption, pure TA&P will not work since these politicians 
are the ones who decide how much TA&P to be applied. Second, there are obstacles for 
implementation of TA&P. Most developing countries lack law enforcement experts, capable public 
officials and the resources for these strategies (Hors, 2000; Salifu, 2008). Finally, the ignorance 
and silence of victims, maintained by a culture of fear nurtured by those who benefit from 
corruption, is another impediment to fighting corruption (Hors, 2000). 
Fitzsimons (2009) conducted an empirical study on relationships between public sector reform 
(which resembling TA&P) and corruption. The author found a significant increase in corruption 
following public sector reform, with an unusual degree of persistence even after general 
institutional reforms had been completed. The surprising conclusion is that unenthusiastic 
reformers may have better control of corruption than those who diligently pursue the 
recommended policies. Similarly, Vian (2007) found that increasing citizens’ voice is not always 
easy, especially in developing countries. Citizens in these countries often have long been 
suppressed by corrupt governments and there is often lack of non-governmental organizations 
and other forms of civic activism. 
We argue that the challenges in implementation of TA&P do not justify bypassing these measures. 
Moreover, the prevalence of political corruption in many developing countries means that the anti-
corruption agenda may need to have more focused targets. Following Salifu (2008), we argue 
that public services (including administrative services) are among sectors that need to apply 
TA&P strategies, especially in early stage of country development. These services directly affect 
citizens’ welfare, and thus their involvement is both necessary and possible. We consider that the 
level of TA&P would significantly reduce corruption in the provision of these services. Therefore 
we hypothesize: 
H2: The levels of a) Transparency; b) Accountability to citizens; and c) Citizen Participation are 
negatively related to corruption in local public services. 
Cross- and within-country studies of corruption 
Most empirical papers examining the impact of corruption on economic development are cross-
country investigations (e.g. Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004; Aidt et al, 2008). In conducting their 
analyses, these papers use datasets spanning a large number of countries over a period of time. 
While these datasets allow them to study similarities and differences between countries and 
across time specified in the sample, they are subject to several limitations such as subjective bias 
and omitted variable bias (unobservable differences in cultures or institutions).  
To overcome these limitations, there has been more interest in studying the socio-economic 
effects of corruption using within country data, in recent years. The key advantage of within-
country data is that it helps eliminate the subjective data bias due to background characteristics. 
However, the majority of these studies either employ data on the US (e.g. Goel and Nelson, 1998; 
Fisman and Gatti, 2002b; Campante and Do, 2014) or the Chinese economy (e.g. Cai et al. 2009; 
Dong, 2011) leaving a few exceptions from other developing countries such as Nepal (e.g. Truex, 
2011), the Philippines (e.g. Azfar & Gurgur, 2008), Papua New Guinea (e.g. Walton, 2015), and 




world would contribute to the literature on how corruption work and what measures are effective 
in such countries. We add to the literature by providing evidence from a within-country study of 
corruption in Vietnam. 
 
Data 
The data for the empirical analysis is drawn from the Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public 
Administration Performance Index (the PAPI) (UNDP, VFF & CECODES, 2014). This is an annual 
large-scale survey of citizens’ experiences in the three mutually reinforcing processes across 
provinces in Vietnam: (i) policy making, (ii) policy implementation, and (iii) the monitoring of public 
service delivery. Its sampling method is probability proportion to size (PPS) to which the selection 
of districts, communes/wards, and villages/groups is randomized. Therefore, the chance of getting 
included in the survey is dependent on the population proportions of those geographical 
observations. Since 2011 the survey has been conducted in all of the 63 provinces in Vietnam. It 
targets annually some 207 districts, 414 communes/wards, and 828 villages/groups. Each year 
about 14,000 people/individuals, aged from 18 and above, are randomly selected for the 
interviews by the questionnaire-based survey method.3 
The measures for our models are summarized in Table 1.4 
 
Table 1: Measures of the variables 




Overall corruption perception, an additive 
number in the six specific measures of 
corruption practices, i.e. diversion of state 
budget, bribes for land titles, bribes for 
health care, bribes for primary education, 
bribes for construction permit, and bribes 
for state employment. 
From 0 - 6 
Corruption perception in 
health care 
Perception of corruption in access to 
public health care 
Averaged scale from 0 to 
2 
Corruption perception in 
primary education 
Perception of corruption in access to 
primary education 
Averaged scale from 0 to 
2 
Citizen participation 
                                                
 
3 For the detailed description of the PAPI surveys, including the survey method and its content, log onto 
http://papi.vn/en/faq.html.  
4 Details on all variable description and source of data in the PAPI questionnaire are presented in Table 2 




Variables Measure Scale 
Voting in local election 
Whether citizens come to vote personally 
in local elections of village heads or 
residential area heads 
Yes (1), No (0) 
Unwillingness to report 
corruptionb 
The amount of bribe to which citizens do 
not mind filing a denunciation to 
responsible government authorities 
Scale from 1-10, 
whereas higher values 
reflect lower willingness 
to report corruption 
Transparency  
Commune budget and 
expenditure disclosure 
Whether commune/ward budget revenue 
and expenditures were publicized 





The extent to which People's Inspection 
Boards function effectively 
Yes (1), No (0) 
Seriousness of local 
governments in dealing 
with corruption cases 
Whether provincial governments are 
serious about dealing with corruption 
cases 
Yes (1), No (0) 
Public service quality: 
Quality of public health 
care 
Average percentage of citizens valuing 
good quality of health care at district public 
hospital, in various aspects 
Average percentage – 
the higher the value, the 
better the service quality 
Quality of public primary 
education 
Average percentage of citizens valuing 
good quality of primary education at public 
primary schools, in various aspects 
Average percentage – 
the higher the value, the 
better the service quality 
This section shows the summary statistics of the PAPI data used in the empirical analysis. The 
data is constructed on the individual-level (Table 2 and Figure 1), and on the district-aggregated 
level (Figure 2).    
Table 2: Overall corruption perception and some governance attributes 
Variables 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Overall corruption perception a 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 
Voting in local elections 72% 73% 71% 67% 
Unwillingness to report corruption b 3.3 3.4 4.1 4.3 
Commune budget and expenditure 
disclosure 
64% 70% 71% 72% 
Effectiveness of People's Inspection 
Boards 
52% 55% 57% 58% 
Seriousness of local governments in 
dealing with corruption cases 




Notes: Figures are in percentage, except otherwise indicated. a The additive individuals’ perception of 
corruption in six specific measures of diversion of state budget, bribes for land titles, bribes for health 
care, bribes for primary education, bribes for construction permit, and bribes for state employment. b The 
higher the value is the more people are unwilling to report corrupt behaviors. 
Table 2 shows that corrupt practices were perceived more widely by citizens overtime. This is 
evidenced by annual increases in the overall level of corruption perception at in the period 2011-
2014. On average, of six listed areas, respondents observed corruption at 1.7 in 2011, 1.8 in 
2012, 1.9 in 2013, and 2.0 areas in 2014.  
The other governance attributes indicate the stance of citizen participation, transparency, 
accountability. Among them, voting in local elections and willingness to report corruption exhibit 
the degree of citizen participation in governance at localities. Citizen participation seemed not 
improve overtime, as there were on average 71%-73% of people directly participated in election 
of the village heads in 2011-2013, and the figure dropped to 67% in 2014. In addition, people 
seemed to more embrace of corrupt behaviors overtime, as the level of unwillingness to report 
corruption increased from 3.3 in 2011 to 4.3 in 2014.  
In other aspects of good governance, transparency improved overtime, as there was an increase 
in the percentage of citizens reporting that commune budget and expenditure information was 
disclosed, from 64% in 2011 to 72% in 2014. Accountability was at low level but enhanced 
annually. Specifically, the percentage of citizen reporting the real effectiveness of the People’s 
Inspection Board increased from 52% in 2011 to 58% in 2014. Similarly, the percentage of citizen 
believed that provincial authorities are serious in dealing with corruption cases rose from 54% in 
2011 to 57% in 2014.  
 






Figure 1 shows the levels of corruption perception over time in the six specific measures of 
corruption practices; namely diversion of state budget, bribes for land titles, bribes for health care, 
bribes for primary education, bribes for construction permit, and bribes for state employment. 
Among these practices, bribes for state employment is perceived the highest, as there were about 
50 percent of the respondents in 2011 agreed that they had to pay bribe for employment in the 
public sector. This figure increased persistently and reached almost 55 percent in 2014. The 
second highest corruption level is perceived in the health care sector. There were more than 40 
percent of the citizens agreed that corrupt practices existed in this area, but remained stable over 
the period 2011-2014. Corruption in the primary education sector increased noticeably overtime, 
as seen through the percentage of respondents seeing the bribe for better attention from teachers 
increasing from 25% in 2011 to more than 30% in 2014. Corruption dynamics in handling of land 
titles and construction permits for citizens looked similar overtime. Corruption is perceived the 
least in the use of state funds, as less than 25% of the respondents over the period 2011-2014 
agreed that public officials diverted state budget for their personal benefits.   
Figure 2 shows a number of district-level aggregates that are believed to affect the interplay 






















perception corresponds to the right scale, while the values of the quality of public service delivery5 
corresponds to the left scale. It is indicated that corruption in health care (at district hospitals) 
remained stable during the period from 2011-2014, having the mean value from 0.68 to 0.69.6 
Corruption in primary education (at primary schools) were likely to increase over time, 
approaching the mean values of 0.46 and 0.48 respectively in 2013 and 2014, compared to those 
of 0.42 in the two previous years. Corruption is thus perceived more widely common in the health 
care sector than in the primary education sector. The quality of public health care and primary 
education seemed to improve during the period 2011-2014. As high as 83% of the respondents 
in 2011 valued the quality of health care at district hospitals, whilst this figure increased to 85%-
86% in the following three years from 2012-2014. The quality of public primary education was 
even valued higher, as 87% of the respondents in 2011 assessed good quality of this kind of 
public service, while this figure uplifted to 89%-90% in the following three years.  
Panel B presents some other district-level aggregates that might affect the quality of health care 
and primary education. The rate of poor household decreased annually from 16% in 2011 to 9% 
in 2014. In the meantime, the percentage of citizens having health insurance rose from 63% 2011 
to 68% in 2014. The panel also shows additional indicators of infrastructure at localities such as 
national electricity, roads, and tab water supply. Almost all of the respondents indicated that they 
had national electricity, 98%-99%. On the contrary, the percentages of citizens reported that they 
had access to paved or concrete roads and tab water supply were lower at 63%-68%, and at 
53%-59%, respectively.  
Panels C and D also indicate education levels and household economic conditions during the 
period from 2011-2014. The former shows that there were on average 64%-65% of the 
respondents having obtained high school education, 12%-13% having secondary education or 
less, and 22%-24% obtaining university education. The latter indicates that the percentage of 
citizens reporting the normal economic condition rose from 71% in 2011 to 74% in 2014. In the 
meantime, the percentages of household having poor economic conditions decreased from 16% 
in 2011 to 13% in 2014, and the rates of respondents reporting the good economic condition 
remained stable at 12%-13% during 2011-2014. 
 
Figure 2: Corruption, quality of public service delivery, and some other aggregates at the 
district level 
                                                
 
5 This is an averaged percentage, which represents a wide number of attributes denoting good quality of 
health care and primary education, respectively.  










This section describes the benchmark econometric models for examining: (i) the effects of citizen 
participation, transparency, and accountability on corruption; and (ii) the effects of corruption on 
the quality of public service delivery, specifically in the health care and primary education sectors. 
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aggregated data. The data used in these two classes of models is in the four-year period from 
2011 to 2014.  
The model for examining the effects of citizen participation, transparency, and 
accountability on corruption 
In this model, citizen participation, transparency, and accountability are more likely thought of the 
man-made design of governance in the public sector. In the meantime, corruption is one of the 
critical indicators that exhibit the quality of governance in the public sector. This first class of 
models is to examine whether changes in citizen participation, transparency, and accountability 
have significant effects on reducing corruption over time. Since the corruption measures used in 
this study are perception-based, they are prone to the selection bias. The respondents’ readiness 
in reporting corruption behaviors, or practices, might be biased against their levels of knowledge, 
attentions, and whether in the past they worked in the public sector. There are two types of models 
to address this selection bias as specified below. First, in the outcome model, the Ordered Probit 
Model is employed to investigate whether citizen participation, transparency, and accountability 
might significantly reduce corruption. Second, in the selection model, the Ordered Probit 
Heckman’s two-step procedure is employed to check whether the perception-based measure of 
corruption is subject to the selection bias.  
The outcome model 
In this model, the independent variable, the level of corruption, is regressed on the explanatory 
variables related to transparency, accountability and participation, while accounting for the other 
control variables:   
!" = $ + &'( + )*+( + ,-"(1) 
Where:  
ü !" is ordered levels of corruption perceived by individual .;  
ü '( is a vector of a number of governance covariates, including citizen participation, 
transparency, and accountability, which are experienced/perceived by individual .;  
ü *+( is a vector of the other control variables, including demographic factors and 
province-specific effects; and 
ü ,-" is a usual random error term that is independently and identically distributed 
(i.i.d.).  
The benchmark model (1) above is regressed on the individual-level data.  The level of corruption 
is an additive measure of corruption perception perceived by individuals in the six areas of the 
state budget, land title, health care, primary education, construction permit, and public job 
recruitment.7 The ordered value of this measure ranges from zero to 6, where zero means no 
corruption and 6 means the highest corruption. This outcome data pattern allows the employment 
of the Ordered Probit estimator for (1). There are two variables denoting citizen participation; 
namely voting in local election and unwillingness to report corruption. The former exhibits whether 
the individuals under survey directly participated in the direct voting of the village heads, and the 
latter measures the level of bribery amount to which the individuals under survey were ready to 
report to relevant authorities. The higher level of direct participation in elections is expected to 
curb corruption, as this helps improve the legitimacy of the people selected at the local authorities. 
                                                
 
7 Detail description of all the dependent and independent variables in the benchmark models (1) to (3) are 




Also, citizen participation in reporting corruption helps enhance the detection mechanism.  Three 
more variables represent the governance attributes that are expected to contain corruption, 
including transparency (measured by disclosure of commune budget and expenditure 
information), accountability (measured by effectiveness of People’s Inspection Boards, and 
seriousness of local governments in dealing with corruption cases).       
The benchmark model (1) also consists of the other demographic variables that are relevant to 
individual and household characteristics. These include gender, age, living experience, ethnic, 
education, profession, whether respondents are household heads, household sizes, and 
household economic conditions. Since the level of corruption is perception-based, controlling for 
these demographic characteristics is important. In addition, controlling for the province-specific 
effects deems salient, as the corruption perception may differ greatly across 63 provinces in 
Vietnam.  
The selection model  
In order to check whether the benchmark equation (1) is subject to the selection bias, a selection 
model is estimated first where the dependent variable !" in (1) is observed if  
/*0( + ,1" > 0                                      (2) 
Where: 
ü *0( is a vector of the covariates that are likely to determine whether !" is observed 
in (1). They include the individuals’ level of education, their attention/interests in 
corruption, and whether they were in the past or currently public servants or 
members of mass organizations; and 
ü ,1"has the same property as ,-" as above, and Corr(,-", ,1") = 5 (Rho) is the 
correlation between the two random error terms in (1) and (2). 
In essence, the two equations (1) and (2) are estimated simultaneously. The Wald test of 





The model for examining the effects of corruption on the quality of public service 
delivery 
To examine the effects of corruption on the quality of health care and primary education, the 
following benchmark model is employed: 
!"6 = $ + &'(7 + )*(7 + 8" + ,-"                           (3) 
Where: 
ü !"6is the quality of health care/primary education as assessed by individuals 
aggregated up to district . and in year 9 (=2011, 2012, 2013, 2014); 
ü '(7is the mean levels of corruption in the specific areas of health care and primary 
education in district . and year 9; 
ü *(7 is a vector of the other covariates representing economic condition, coverage 
of health insurance (a determinant of health care), education, and general 
infrastructure in district .and year 9; and 
ü 8" is an unobservable district-specific effect, which differs across district but does 
not change over time; and  
ü ,-" is the usual random error term.  
The factor of local economic conditions is a critical one to determine the quality of health care and 
primary education. There are two variables that deem to capture the economic condition at 
districts in the equation (3): rate of poor households and rate of households with normal and good 
economic conditions. The quality of health care is specifically affected by the ratio of people 
having health insurance in districts, denoted by the variable having health insurance. In addition, 
the quality of general infrastructure is likely to affect the access, and, in turn, the quality of these 
two public services. In this study the variables such access to national electricity, access to paved 
or concrete roads, and access to tap water supply represent the initial conditions of local 
infrastructure that might affect the quality of health care and primary education. In a certain district 
the ratios of individuals obtaining the levels of high school and university education are employed 
to control for citizen knowledge that might affect citizens’ perception of the quality of public 
services. There are thus many factors working on the quality of health care and primary education 
at the district level. To address this issue, the equation (3) is estimated using the panel-data fixed 
effect regression. This estimator is advantageous over the other approaches, as it allows to rule 
out 8" in (3), which account for a wide range of unobservable district-specific effects that 
presumably do not change overtime such as infrastructure, population density, remoteness, and 






Effects of citizen transparency, accountability, and participation on corruption  
Table 3 shows the regression results for the effects of citizen participation, transparency, and 
accountability on corruption. The model specification (1) in section 5 is estimated separately for 
every single year from 2011 to 2014. Table 3 also indicates that the disclosure of the commune 
budget and expenditure (transparency) helps reduce corruption in 2011, 2012, and 2014, but not 
in 2013.8 This generally supports hypothesis 2a. 
The empirical results also indicate that citizen participation in the voting of the villages’ head 
negatively related to corruption across four years, but the more significant and profound effects 
are achieved in 2011 and 2012. In another aspect of citizen participation, unwillingness to report 
corruption is positively and significantly associated with corruption. Specifically, wherever people 
are less ready to report corrupt behaviors, corruption at their locality is more widespread. These 
results provide a solid support for H2c. 
Another channel for curbing corruption is to enhance accountability in the public sector. The 
regression results in Table 3 show that the effectiveness of People’s Inspection Boards 
contributes to contain corruption overtime, except for the year 20129. The operation of these 
boards had larger and more statistically significant effects over time on reducing corruption in 
2011-2014. Similarly, seriousness of local governments in dealing with corruption cases is 
significantly and negatively related to corruption. The will and determination of the provincial 
authorities seem to curb corruption, as there were large and consistent effects of this factor on 
reducing corruption overtime. The provincial authorities’ willingness to seriously address 
corruption helps reduce corruption by the levels ranging from 0.436 in 2014 to 0.723 in 2012, 
higher than any other attributes of governance in Table 3. Hypothesis 2b is strongly supported. 
Table 3: Effects of transparency, accountability and participation on corruption 
Dependent variable:  
Overall corruption perception 
Years 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
Governance attributes     
Disclosure of commune budget 
and expenditure information -0.238*** -0.394*** -0.064 -0.149*** 
 (0.057) (0.068) (0.051) (0.040) 
Voting in local elections -0.137** -0.169*** -0.091* -0.063* 
                                                
 
8 This might be due to relatively high correlation between the two variables of commune budget and 
expenditure disclosure and the effectiveness of People’s Inspection Boards (PIBs). The impact of commune 
budget and expenditure disclosure could be confounded in the effectiveness of PIBs, leading to the 
insignificant effect of the former in 2013.   
9 This might be due to relatively high correlation between the two variables of commune budget and 
expenditure disclosure and the effectiveness of People’s Inspection Boards. The impact of the effectiveness 
of the People’s Inspection Boards could be confounded in commune budget and expenditure disclosure, 




Dependent variable:  
Overall corruption perception 
Years 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.051) (0.035) 
Unwillingness to report corruption 0.046*** 0.057*** 0.044*** 0.055*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) 
Effectiveness of People's 
Inspection Boards -0.090* -0.027 -0.188*** -0.108*** 
 (0.053) (0.046) (0.043) (0.035) 
Seriousness of local governments 
in dealing with corruption cases -0.643*** -0.723*** -0.680*** -0.436*** 
 
(0.054) (0.056) (0.040) (0.038) 
Demographic variables  	 	 	
Gender 0.055 -0.013 0.059 0.112*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.046) (0.037) 
Age -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Length of permanent residency  0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Ethnicity 0.016 0.023 0.087 -0.006 
 (0.076) (0.105) (0.082) (0.060) 
University education -0.266*** -0.115 -0.278** 0.219*** 
 (0.098) (0.122) (0.112) (0.073) 
High school 0.039 0.235* -0.082 -0.030 
 (0.135) (0.139) (0.122) (0.058) 
Family size -0.015 -0.033* -0.005 0.014 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.013) (0.009) 
Unskilled profession -0.092 0.039 0.065 -0.045 
 (0.062) (0.078) (0.065) (0.047) 
Skilled profession -0.170** -0.032 0.065 0.032 
 (0.081) (0.083) (0.078) (0.057) 
Business owner -0.050 0.043 0.169* 0.050 
 (0.104) (0.103) (0.087) (0.063) 
Household head -0.024 0.010 0.026 -0.007 
 (0.062) (0.059) (0.045) (0.039) 




Dependent variable:  
Overall corruption perception 
Years 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.069) (0.060) 
Good economic condition -0.204** -0.160 -0.070 -0.202*** 
 (0.093) (0.109) (0.085) (0.068) 
Provincial-specific effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 7.2% 8.0% 6.5% 4.4% 
Number of observations 2,194 2,264 3,149 4,961 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and robust to the cross sectional dependence within 
districts. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
With respect to the other control variables, the empirical results show that there are no significantly 
consistent impacts of gender, age, length of permanent residency, ethnic, family size, profession, 
the status of household’s head on the corruption levels as perceived by individuals in 2011-2014. 
Some other demographic variables such as education and household’s economic condition have 
significant effects in selective years. For example, citizens with university education are likely to 
judge corruption significantly lower than those with secondary education or less in 2011 and 2013, 
but not in 2014. There is thus no clear cut between the levels of corruption as perceived by people 
with high and low educations over time. The individuals living in household with good and normal 
economic conditions judge corruption less severely than those living in household with poor 
economic conditions. In 2014 the former perceive corruption lower by the level of about 0.2 than 
the latter.  
Controlling for selection bias 
Since corruption is a sensitive issue, the perception-based measure of corruption is likely biased 
against a number of individuals’ characteristics such as education, attention to news, and whether 
they are currently or previously members of mass organizations or public servants. If this is a 
serious issue, the corruption levels as reported by individuals are subject to the selection bias 
where in the first step people are not aware of the corruption practices, or do not feel comfortable 
in reporting corruption. We addressed this issues by using the Ordered Probit Heckman’s two 
step procedures where the benchmark models (1) and (2) in the empirical strategy section are 
estimated simultaneously. Although the variables like education, attention to news, and whether 
they are currently or previously members of mass organizations or public servants seem to 
constrain citizen perception of corruption, the Wald test of independent equations rejects the 
independent equations, indicating that the selection bias in the PAPI data is not a serious issue. 
The empirical results in Table 2 could thus be used for empirical analysis and policy discussions. 
Effects of corruption on the quality of public health care and primary education  
Since corrupt behaviors extract valuable resources in the delivery of public services, they are 
expected to lower the quality of public services as received by the beneficiaries, or the end-users. 
Table 4 and Table 5 respectively show the estimated results for the effects of corruption on the 
quality of health care and primary education, after having controlled the other factors deemed to 
affect the services’ quality at localities. 




There are three model specifications in Table 4, where the relevant control variables are 
subsequently included in the regressions. The overall empirical findings across specifications (1) 
to (3) indicate that corruption has the negative effects on the quality of health care. These effects 
are statistically significant at the very high level of one percent, and consistent in magnitude 
across all the specification equations. Hypothesis 1a was supported. 
Table 4: Corruption and the quality of health care 
Dependent variable:  
Averaged quality of health care 
(1) (2) (3) 
Perception of corruption in public health 
care 
-0.070*** -0.057*** -0.063*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Rate of poor households 
 -0.107*** -0.126*** 
 (0.030) (0.040) 
Having health insurance 
 0.062** 0.063** 
 (0.027) (0.029) 
High school 
 	 -0.003 
 	 (0.040) 
University education  
 	 -0.160*** 
 	 (0.053) 
Normal household economic condition 
 	 -0.057 
 	 (0.044) 
Good household economic condition 
 	 -0.137** 
 	 (0.054) 
Access to national electricity 
 	 0.048 
 	 (0.077) 
Access to paved or concrete roads 
 	 0.071** 
 	 (0.031) 
Access to tap water supply 
 	 0.042 
 	 (0.027) 
Number of observations 824 788 719 
R-squared (within) 4.7% 6.6% 12.3% 






With respect to the other determinants of health care, in the specification equations (2) and (3), 
the districts with the higher rates of poor households have significantly lower quality of health 
care. This finding raises concerns over the most disadvantageous districts in Vietnam, where 
prolonged poverty could deteriorate basic health care for the local people. The status of having 
health insurance could also have potential effects on the quality of health care at district hospitals. 
The specifications (2) and (3) manifest that having health insurance raise the quality of health 
care as perceived by individuals, which is independent of education and economic conditions as 
indicated in (3). Specifically, the districts with the higher rates of people having health insurance 
is associated with the higher quality of health care. This could lay a foundation for the plan of 
making health insurance universal as currently undertaking by the government. In the districts 
with the higher rates of people having university education, the quality of health care is on average 
perceived lower. This finds evidence in the specifications (3), as the estimated coefficients for the 
variable university education are both negative and statistically significant at the level of one 
percent and five percent, respectively. Additionally, in those districts with the higher rates of 
households with good economic condition, the quality of health care is also perceived lower as 
indicated in the specifications (3). These findings might be grounded on the fact that people with 
higher education and better household economic conditions are better aware of, and have a 
higher demand as well for, the quality of public services, resulting in the lower quality of health 
care as exhibited in the regression equations.    
Effects of corruption on the quality of public primary education 
Table 5 shows that corruption has a negative relationship with the quality of primary education at 
the district level. These effects are statistically significant and consistent in magnitude across the 
three model specifications from (1) to (3). Specifically, the estimated coefficients for the variable 
corruption perception in primary education basically remain unchanged when further control 
variables are included in the relevant regression models. Hypothesis 1b is supported. 
In comparison with the health care sector, corruption seems to affect the primary education less 
severely due to its universal coverage and free access (in the public schools). The variable rate 
of poor household is included in the specification (2), and the estimated coefficient shows that the 
quality of primary education is negatively associated with the rate of poor households, but this 
effect is no longer statistically significant in (3) where additional control variables are included. 
The household economic condition related positively to the quality of primary education; namely, 
the quality is perceived higher in the districts with the higher rates of households having the good 
economic condition compared to those having the poor economic conditions. In addition, the 
conditions of the local infrastructure related to paved/concrete roads and the national electricity’s 
access have a positive association with the quality of primary education. These results are 
noticeable, as the infrastructure of this kind has no significant effects on the quality of health care 
as indicated in Table 4. The different effects could be explained on the ground that the primary 
education is more regularly reliant on the access to the national electricity and to paved/concrete 





Table 5: Corruption and the quality of primary education 
Dependent variable:  
Quality of primary education 
(1) (2) (3) 
Perception of corruption in public primary 
education 
-0.040*** -0.033** -0.037** 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Rate of poor households 
 -0.124*** 0.035 
 (0.031) (0.039) 
High school 
 	 -0.005 
 	 (0.040) 
University education  
 	 0.054 
 	 (0.052) 
Normal household economic condition 
 	 0.044 
 	 (0.044) 
Good household economic condition 
 	 0.120** 
 	 (0.053) 
Access to national electricity 
 	 0.179** 
 	 (0.075) 
Access to paved or concrete roads 
 	 0.113*** 
 	 (0.030) 
Access to tap water supply 
 	 0.029 
 	 (0.027) 
Number of observations 824 788 719 
R-squared (within) 1.2% 3.5% 8.8% 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Discussions 
We set out in this study to empirically examine whether or not citizen participation, transparency, 
and accountability are associated with less corruption, and whether lower levels of corruption 
relate to better public service quality. The PAPI data is ideal for us to conduct these examinations 
in the Vietnamese context.  
Our results show that persistent corruption is associated with low quality education and healthcare 
services. This is contrary to the “greasing the wheels” notion which suggests that corruption adds 
good value to developing countries (Meon & Sekkat, 2005). While bribes may speed up some 
administrative procedures and provide incentives for better services, these effects are largely 




losses of innovation, commitment, and morality of service delivery staff are much more damaging, 
as seen in other studies (see Gabel, 2012; Nguyen et al., 2016 for example). Where corruption is 
prevalent, public service delivery personnel pay attention to getting bribes or informal payments 
from citizens and are distracted from improving quality of service. Worse still, some of the 
resources designated to the primary education and health care at the district level may be drained 
by corrupt behaviors by the time they reach the end-users. This damage is especially serious in 
poor countries where commitment, morality, and innovation are very fragile in the public sector. 
Future research should detangle possible short-term, transaction-specific positive effects from 
long-term, overall damages of corruption on public service deliveries. 
The research also provides evidence that in developing countries like Viet Nam, TA&P help 
reduce corruption. The results support the “good governance” hypothesis which proposes that 
TA&P are effective anti-corruption strategies, even in developing countries (see Kaufmann, 2005; 
Wells-Dang, Le, & Nguyen, 2015). It is important to note that the data in this research captures 
corruption practices in public primary education and public healthcare at the local level. Whether 
TA&P would have a similar impact on corruption in other sectors, (as queried in Khan, 2006; 
Spector, 2005) remains a topic for further research. 
Our research relates to public servants’ accountability to citizens, an often-neglected type of 
accountability in developing countries (Brinkerhoff, 2004; Devas & Grant, 2003). The results show 
that accountability to citizens most strongly reduces corruption. While we conceptualize 
participation, accountability, and transparency as three attributes of local governance, it is likely 
that transparency and participation are preconditions of accountability, as supported by Devas & 
Grant (2003), and Wells-Dang, Le, and Nguyen (2015). This complex relationship among TA&P 
deserves further examination.  
In Vietnam’s transition, good governance principles in a market economy are struggling with the 
inertia of the state control, rooted in the traditional socialist system (Martin, 2008). We have shown 
that TA&P contribute to anti-corruption results, which further help improve public service quality. 
Yet, the promotion of these good governance principles remains a challenge in Viet Nam. The 
challenge comes not only from the limited capability of government officials but also from the 
equivocality of the development ideology as Nguyen (2005) discussed. It would be interesting to 







Our study offers several recommendations for consideration in government policy making to 
enhance local governance and to reduce corruption. These suggestions speak to the key 
attributing factors under discussion of this research paper: citizen participation, transparency and 
vertical accountability.  
First, active citizen participation in local political life through transparent and fair elections of 
village heads is critical. So is it for citizen engagement in reporting corruption however petty the 
corruption practices is. Promoting citizen activism in the political context of Viet Nam requires the 
openness and pro-activeness of both sides of the coin: the citizenry and the government. With a 
more rights-based constitutional foundation set forth in the 2013 Constitution, together with the 
support of new technology and more open media, there is light of hopes for greater genuine citizen 
participation for better governance in Viet Nam in the years to come.  
Second, genuine participation is hard to obtain in anti-corruption agendas when citizens are not 
encouraged to report against any wrong doings by public officials and when they feel they are not 
protected when taking anti-corruption initiatives. As our research has shown, citizens’ willingness 
to report corrupt practices decreased in the period from 2011-2014. Promoting the roles of media 
and civil society to be the intermediary platforms for citizens to report on corruption will help central 
and local governments to prevent corruption. Upcoming revisions to anti-corruption legislations 
should spell this out more profoundly so as to improve the effectiveness of anti-corruption work in 
Viet Nam.   
Third, citizen participation and the accountability mechanism like People’s Inspection Boards 
would be meaningless if transparency is not respected. In the last decade, the need for more 
transparency and information disclosure has been well recognized. However, the relevance (i.e. 
the level of details and disaggregation of data) and quality (i.e. the reliability and timeliness) of 
information needs to be improved. In an essence, disclosure of budget and expenditure 
information helps reduce corruption at local levels while more access to other types of government 
information would be necessary to enhance anti-corruption effectiveness. It is timely for a Law on 
Access to Information that facilitates rather than policing access to information to be promulgated. 
The law will serve as a legal framework to foster transparency and engage citizens and institutions 
in calling central and local governments into account and keeping public service delivery agencies 
under check to better control corruption. In addition, building strong databases in important areas, 
such as a land registrar system and an open budget system for both central and local 
governments, would be critical in promoting citizen access to information.  
Third, accountability to citizens and non-state actors need to be fostered among public officials 
and civil servants. As the research and UNDP, CECDES and VFF (2014) have pointed out, it is 
important to improve the effectiveness of the People’s Inspection Boards, the grassroots 
monitoring mechanisms by citizens to keep the performance of public officials and civil servants 
under check. By giving PIBs enlarging space, necessary skills and easy-to-follow toolkits, these 
boards will exercise their mandates and power as promulgated in the Ordinance on Grassroots 
Democracy and the Law on Inspection. In order for PIBs to be effective, citizen participation in 
selection of their members is a must.   
Last but not the least, fostering good governance means that the government needs to gain a 
considerable trust from the public. To this end, there should be a fundamental shift in the mindset 
and attitude of public officials. Providing good information to the public, inviting the public to 
participate in policy agenda, and responding accountably to the public concerns are good 
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Table 1: Effects of citizen participation, transparency, and accountability on corruption 
(controlling for selection bias) 
Dependent variable:  
Overall corruption perception 
Years 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
Governance's attributes  	 	 	
Voting in local election -0.132** -0.174*** -0.091* -0.065* 
 (0.060) (0.057) (0.051) (0.035) 
Disclosure of commune budget and 
expenditure information  -0.228*** -0.395*** -0.067 -0.150*** 
 (0.057) (0.067) (0.051) (0.039) 
Effectiveness of People's Inspection 
Boards -0.090* -0.025 -0.191*** -0.107*** 
 (0.053) (0.046) (0.044) (0.035) 
Unwillingness to report corruption 
cases 0.046*** 0.056*** 0.045*** 0.054*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) 
Seriousness of local governments in 
dealing with corruption -0.645*** -0.726*** -0.679*** -0.434*** 
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.040) (0.038) 
Demographic variables  	 	 	
Gender 0.05 -0.019 0.060 0.115*** 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.046) (0.037) 
Age -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Length of permanent residency 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Ethnicity 0.011 0.027 0.091 -0.002 
 (0.076) (0.105) (0.083) (0.060) 
University education -0.261** -0.160 -0.325** 0.192** 
 (0.119) (0.141) (0.126) (0.083) 
Secondary education 0.057 0.166 -0.135 -0.050 
 (0.150) (0.163) (0.139) (0.066) 
Family size -0.015 -0.032* -0.004 0.015 




Dependent variable:  
Overall corruption perception 
Years 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
Unskilled profession -0.089 0.046 0.067 -0.044 
 (0.061) (0.078) (0.065) (0.047) 
Skilled profession -0.168** -0.027 0.067 0.030 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.078) (0.056) 
Business owner -0.058 0.051 0.172** 0.054 
 (0.106) (0.102) (0.087) (0.062) 
Household head -0.023 0.013 0.025 -0.008 
 (0.064) (0.059) (0.045) (0.039) 
Normal economic condition -0.147* -0.063 -0.078 -0.203*** 
 (0.087) (0.088) (0.068) (0.060) 
Good economic condition -0.194** -0.160 -0.078 -0.203*** 
 (0.094) (0.110) (0.085) (0.068) 
Variables controlling for selection bias    
University education 0.534*** 0.642*** 0.563*** 0.365*** 
 (0.052) (0.060) (0.064) (0.059) 
High school 0.623*** 0.764*** 0.577*** 0.339*** 
 (0.071) (0.076) (0.080) (0.034) 
Attention to news 0.272*** 0.229*** 0.247*** 0.163*** 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) 
Member of a mass organization 0.302*** 0.371*** 0.350*** 0.212*** 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.027) 
Former public servant 0.516*** 0.356*** 0.458*** 0.270*** 
 (0.068) (0.070) (0.083) (0.079) 
Provincial-specific effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,536 9,518 9,202 10,769 
Uncensored observations 2,175 2,257 3,145 4,951 
Censored observations 7,361 7,261 6,057 5,818 
Rho 0.022 -0.078 -0.078 -0.079 
Wald test of independent equations 0.875 0.568 0.498 0.496 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and robust to the cross sectional dependence within districts. 





Table 2: Variable description and source of data in PAPI 
No Variable's name Level of data Type of data Description 
Questions in 
PAPI 
QUESTION 1     
1 Overall corruption perception Individual 
Scale from 0-6, the 
greater the more 
corruption 
Overall corruption perception, an additive number 
in the six specific measures of corruption practices, 
i.e. diversion of state budget, bribes for land titles, 
bribes for health care, bribes for primary education, 
bribes for construction permit, and bribes for state 
employment. 
D402 
2 Voting in local election Individual Yes (1), No (0) 
Whether citizens come to vote personally in local 
elections of village heads or residential area heads D106a 
3 
Commune budget and 
expenditure disclosure Individual Yes (1), No (0) 
Whether commune/ward budget revenue and 
expenditures were publicized D203 
4 Effectiveness of People's Inspection Boards Individual Yes (1), No (0) 
The extent to which People's Inspection Boards 
function effectively D303, D303c 
5 Unwillingness to report corruptionb Individual 
Scale from 1-10, 
whereas higher values 
reflect lower 
willingness to report 
corruption 
The amount of bribe to which citizens do not mind 




Seriousness of local 
governments in dealing with 
corruption cases 
Individual Yes (1), No (0) 
Whether provincial governments are serious about 




7 Perception of six corruption practices Individual Yes (1), No (0) 
Corruption perception in the six specific areas of 
the state budget, land title, health care, primary 
education, construction permit, and the public job 
recruitment.  
D402 
8 Gender  Individual Yes (1), No (0) Citizen's gender A001 
9 Age Individual Positive integers Citizen's age A002 
10 Living experience Individual Positive integers Citizen's living experience in the commune/ward A003 
11 Ethnic Individual Yes (1), No (0) Citizen's ethnicity: Kinh versus others A005 
12 University education Individual Yes (1), No (0) Citizen's education at university level and above A006 
13 High school Individual Yes (1), No (0) Citizen's education at high school level A006 
14 Family size Individual Positive integers Total members in the family A007 
15 Unskilled profession Individual Yes (1), No (0) Profession of the household head A010a 
16 Skilled profession Individual Yes (1), No (0) Profession of the household head A010a 
17 Business owner Individual Yes (1), No (0) Profession of the household head A010a 
18 Household's head Individual Yes (1), No (0) Whether the respondent is the household head A010 
19 Normal economic condition Individual Yes (1), No (0) Today's economic condition of the family A011 
20 Good economic condition Individual Yes (1), No (0) Today's economic condition of the family A011 
21 Provincial-specific effect Province Yes (1), No (0) Province-specific effects of 63 provinces  
Question 1 (controlling for selection bias)    
 Attention to news Individual Yes (1), No (0) Attention to national affairs and government A012 
 Member of mass organization Individual Yes (1), No (0) Current membership of mass organizations A016 





QUESTION 2     
22 Averaged quality of health care District Averaged percentage 
This is an averaged figure of the ratios valuing good 
quality of health care, at public district hospitals, in 
various aspects 
D604d 
23 Averaged quality of primary education District Averaged percentage 
This is an averaged figure of the ratios valuing good 
quality of primary education, at public primary 
schools in the commune/ward, in various aspects 
D606cd 
24 Corruption perception in health care District 
Averaged, scale from 0 
to 2, the greater the 
more corruption 
Corruption perception in the specific area of health 
care D402c 
25 Corruption perception in primary education District 
Averaged, scale from 0 
to 2, the greater the 
more corruption 
Corruption perception in the specific area of primary 
education D402d 
26 Rate of poor households District Aggregated percentage Rates of poor households D201 
27 Having health insurance District Aggregated percentage Rates of people having health insurance D601 
28 Having national electricity District Aggregated percentage Rate of households having electricity in the house D607 
29 Paved or concrete roads District Aggregated percentage Quality of the roads closest to the house D608 
30 Tap water supply District Aggregated percentage Rate of household having tap water supply D610 
 
